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Abstract. Protecting personal privacy is going to be a prime concern for the de-
ployment of ubiquitous computing systems in the real world. With daunting Or-
wellian visions looming, it is easy to conclude that tamper-proof technical pro-
tection mechanisms such as strong anonymization and encryption are the only
solutions to such privacy threats. However, we argue that such perfect protection
for personal information will hardly be achievable, and propose instead to build
systems that help others respect our personal privacy, enable us to be aware of
our own privacy, and to rely on social and legal norms to protect us from the
few wrongdoers. We introduce a privacy awareness system targeted at ubiqui-
tous computing environments that allows data collectors to both announce and
implement data usage policies, as well as providing data subjects with techni-
cal means to keep track of their personal information as it is stored, used, and
possibly removed from the system. Even though such a system cannot guarantee
our privacy, we believe that it can create a sense of accountability in a world of
invisible services that we will be comfortable living in and interacting with.
1 Motivation
It is undisputed that a future worldfull of smart and cooperatingartifacts will pose great
risks to our personal privacy: In an environment containing countless, invisible sensors
that constantly monitor their surroundings and communicate their ﬁndings to each of
their peers, both real-world and virtual transactions are certain to ﬁnd their way into
sheer limitless data storage systems, to be saved forever and recalled at a moment’s
notice. Much under discussion, however, is how to deal with this frightening vision.
Should we give up on privacy as we know it today, and – at least potentially – make
everybody see everything anytime [2]? Or should we instead try even harder to ﬁnd
the technological means that guarantee that our information stays private by employing
state-of-the-art encryption and anonymization technology?
Even though clever anonymization technology [10] can make tracing our digital
identity almost impossible, and encryption schemes exist that seem to be sufﬁciently
hard to break in the foreseeable future, personal privacy entails more than just secret
communication and masked identity. Unless we want to abandon our current social
interactions completely and deal only behind digital pseudonyms in virtual reality with
each other, we must realize that our real-world presence cannot be completely hidden,
nor perfectly anonymized. Neither can postal addresses or names stored in a databasebe protected from copying (like digital music) using digital watermarks, not unless
we want to give up our (human-readable) ﬁrst names, last name, and street names for
large (machine-readable) binary representations that provide us with sufﬁcient amount
of information to embed such security features.
The privacy awareness system (pawS) presented here aims to strike a reasonable
balance between those two approaches. It follows a fundamental principle used in to-
day’s democratic societies: to give people the ability to respect other people’s safety,
property, or privacy, and to rely on corresponding social norms, legal deterrence, and
law enforcement to create a reasonable expectation that people will follow such rules.
Examples for such inherently unsafe, yet trusted mechanisms are road trafﬁc (where we
don’t directly regulate how someone drives but instead punish those who fail to follow
the rules) or the local newspaper stand (where it might be possible to just pick up a pa-
per without paying but where we rely on law enforcement to catch the thief eventually).
Road signs and a monetary system are in these cases the mechanisms that allow people
to respect other people’s safety and property, yet do not guarantee that they are being
used properly. Similarly, pawS provides collection and processing tools that allow data
collectors and processors to communicate their collection and procession details to us,
and help them keep their promises. While in individual cases more protection might be
required (e.g., for sensitive data such as health records), most situations of our daily
life should be adequately “protected” through such tools and corresponding enforce-
ment and recourse mechanisms that allow holding people accountable to their public
statements and actions.
Based on these assumptions, section 2 will present a short overview of our sys-
tem, followed by the list of design requirements underlying its architecture. Section 3
then gives brief details on the current prototype pawS implementation, followed by a
summary and pointers to future work in section 4.
2 General principle and requirements
Figure 1 on the next page shows an example of pawS in operation: Upon entering a
ubicomp environment with a number of available services (here: a print service and a
locationtrackingserviceusingavideocamera),aprivacybeacon(1)announcesthedata
collections of each service and their policies using a wireless communications channel
such as Bluetooth or IrDA. In order to save energy, the mobile privacy assistant (2) the
user is carrying delegates this information to the user’s personal privacy proxy residing
somewhere on the Internet (3), which contacts the corresponding service proxies at
their advertised addresses (4) and inquires their privacy policies. After comparing those
privacy policies to the user’s privacy preferences, the user proxy decides to decline
usage of the tracking service, which results in disabling the location tracking service of
the video camera (5).
In designing the general architecture of such a privacy awareness system, we fol-
lowed six principles set out earlier for preserving privacy in ubiquitous computing
[8]: notice, choice and consent, proximity and locality, anonymity and pseudonymi-
ty, security, and access and recourse. As pointed out in the introduction, anonymity,
pseudonymity, and security (i.e., secure communication and access) are useful toolswhen being a supportive part of the infrastructure, but should not be taken as isolated
solutions. Consequently, our system employs anonymous and secure connections, as
well as reasonable access controls, whenever possible to prevent unwanted data spills
and trivial data snifﬁng. Our main focus, however, lies on implementing the other four
principles for use in a ubiquitous computing (ubicomp) environment:
– Notice: Given a ubicomp environment where it is often difﬁcult for data subjects
to realize that data collection is actually taking place, we will not only need mecha-
nisms to declare collection practices (i.e., privacy policies), but also efﬁcient ways
to communicate these to the user (i.e., policy announcement).
– Choice and consent: In order to give users a true choice, we need to provide a
selection mechanism (i.e., privacy agreements) so that users can indicate which
services they prefer.
– Proximity and locality:The system should support mechanisms to encode anduse
locality information for collected data that can enforce access restrictions based on
the location of the person wanting to use the data.
– Access and recourse: Our system needs to provide a way for users to access their
personal information in a simple way through standardized interfaces (i.e., data
access). Users should be informed about the usage of their data once it is stored,
similar to call-lists that are often part of monthly phone bills (i.e., usage logs).
The following sections describe the four core concepts of our system, which pro-
vide us with the necessary functionality to implement the high-level requirements listed
above: Machine-readable privacy policies to provide choice and consent, policy an-
nouncement mechanisms to give notice, privacy proxies for supporting access, and
privacy-aware databases for recourse. While proximity and locality are not yet ad-
Fig.1. Overview of the Privacy Management System: Upon entering a ubicomp environment
with a number of data collections taking place (3,4), optional services can be conﬁgured to suit
the user’s privacy preferences (5). See section 2 for operation details. Mandatory data collections
(e.g., security cameras) can at least be detected (1) and collection details be recorded (2), allowing
users or consumer interest groups to hold data collectors accountable for their statements.dressed in the current prototype, extension mechanisms allow for their implementation
once suitable representation techniques have been developed.
2.1 Machine-readable privacy policies
Privacy policies are an established principle in legal domains to codify data collection
and usage practices. Within the “Platform for Privacy Preferences Project (P3P),” the
World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) recently ﬁnalized work that allows the encoding
of such privacy policies into machine-readable XML, allowing automated processes to
read such policies and take actions on them [6]. Figure 2 shows an abbreviated example
of such a P3P privacy policy. It contains XML elements to describe for example who
is collecting information (line 2, abbreviated), what data is being collected (lines 15-
18), for whom (line 13), and why (line 12). For a more detailed explanation of the
XML syntax see [6]. Using a similarly machine-readable preference language such as
APPEL [5], users can express personal preferences over all aspects of such policies and
have automated processes judge the acceptability of any such policy, or prompt for a
decision instead. Since it might be cumbersome to manually create such preferences
from scratch, a trusted third party (e.g., a consumer interest group) could provide pre-
conﬁgured preference speciﬁcations that would then be downloaded and individually
adjusted by each user.
Together with some domain-speciﬁc extension (e.g., location), these mechanisms
allow data collectors in a ubicomp environment to specify data collection, storage and
distribution parameters that can be automatically processed by user clients (choice and
consent). It is important to note that typical environments will involve a reasonably
01: <POLICY name="FollowMe" discuri="http://www.example.org/services/follow-me/">
02: <ENTITY> ... </ENTITY>
03: <DISPUTES-GROUP> ... </DISPUTES-GROUP>
04: <ACCESS><all/>
05: <EXTENSION optional="yes"> <ACCESS-METHODS>
06: <UPDATE rpc_uri="http://www.example.org/soap/" service_urn="access">
07: <DATA ref="#user.login.password"/> </UPDATE> </ACCESS-METHODS>
08: </EXTENSION>
09: </ACCESS>
10: <STATEMENT>
11: <CONSEQUENCE>Your telephone calls will be routed to you.</CONSEQUENCE>
12: <PURPOSE><current/></PURPOSE>
13: <RECIPIENT><ours/></RECIPIENT>
14: <RETENTION><stated-purpose/></RETENTION>
15: <DATA-GROUP> <DATA ref="#user.login.id"/>
16: <DATA ref="#user.login.password"/>
17: <DATA ref="#user.location.current.symbolic.room">
18: </DATA-GROUP>
19: </STATEMENT>
20: </POLICY>
Fig.2. Example of a P3P policy for a follow-me telephone service (abbreviated, including access
extensions): Apart from the user’s id and password that has to be submitted when trying to use the
service (lines 15-16), the service also (implicitly) collects the user’s current location (e.g., room
number) through a tracking system (line 17). An extension to the regular P3P syntax additionally
describes the proxy access to the collected data (lines 5-8). See [6] for details.small number of policies, even though a large number of sensors and data exchanges
might be present, since policies are typically on a per realm or task basis. This means
that the setup of a ubicomp environment with P3P policies is quite feasible.
2.2 Policy announcement mechanisms
While P3P is a Web technology and thus uses HTTP-headers as well as well-known
URI-locations on each Web server to help user clients locate such policies, we need
an alternative mechanism in a ubicomp environment. We can differentiate between two
types of data collection that will need different ways of communicating such privacy
policies to the data subject (notice):
– Implicit announcement: In many cases, the user client is actively locating and
using a service offered by the environment. In this case, we embed links to the P3P
policy (or even the policy itself) into the service discovery protocol, such as the one
in Jini [11].
– Activepolicyannouncement:Someservicessuchasaudioorvideotrackingmight
work continuously in the background, without the need for user interaction in order
to gather data. In this case, a privacy beacon must used that constantly announces
the privacy policies of implicitly running data collections, using a short-range wire-
less link.
2.3 Privacy proxies
Privacy proxies handle privacy relevant interactions between data subjects and data col-
lectors (i.e., policy access and data collection) but also provide access to speciﬁc user
control capabilities disclosed in the privacy policy such as data updates and deletes,
or querying usage logs. Privacy proxies are continuously running services that can be
contacted and queried by data subjects anytime, allowing them instant access to their
data. Each ubicomp environment either features a single such service proxy to handle
all its data collections, or multiple service proxies for each individual service it offers.
Similarly, each user is expected to have a corresponding personal privacy proxy, which
handles all interaction between service proxies in order to exchange user data or query
their usage logs (in case of disconnects, a mobile device could temporarily act as a
substitute for a personal privacy proxy residing on the network). Privacy proxies are
conﬁgured using a preference language such as APPEL, described above, typically in-
volving a small set of general rules (which could be created by a trusted third party and
downloaded by the user) and a larger set of speciﬁc rules incrementally created by the
user. As part of such an interaction between user and service proxies, an agreement is
made in form of an XML-document containing the data elements exchanged and the
privacy policy applying to them (both is encoded in the P3P policy). Such an agreement
document also contains an explicit agreement-id for later reference, as well as detailed
information on how the user proxy can access the service proxy (see our extensions to
the ACCESS element in ﬁgure 2, lines 5-8). Should the user decide to update her email
address with all places that have it on ﬁle, her privacy proxy contacts each service’s
update function to transparently update the changed data (access).2.4 Policy-based data access
Once data has been solicited from the user (either actively by receiving a data submis-
sion via the privacy proxy, or implicitly by receiving sensor data such as video or audio
feed), it is stored in a back-end database (not shown in ﬁgure 1 above). In order to pre-
vent accidental use of information that is in disagreement with the previously granted
privacy policy, the database not only stores the data collected, but also each individual
privacy policy that it was collected under. By combining both data elements and their
respective policy into a single unit managed by the database, we can have the database
take care of observing that the promises made in a privacy policy with respect to the
lifetime, usage, and recipient of a certain piece of information are kept, as well as pro-
vide users with a detailed “usage log” of their personal data (recourse). Note that since
policies are often invariant for a large number of collected data elements, storing an
additional pointer to such a policy only adds a small overhead for storage requirements.
3 Implementation
In a ﬁrst step, two parts of our pawS architecture have been implemented: privacy prox-
ies that allow for the automated exchange and update of both privacy policies and user
data; and a privacy-aware database (called pawDB) that combines the collected data el-
ements and their privacy policies into a single unit for storage in order to consequently
handle the data according to its usage policy.
Privacy proxies are implemented as a set of SOAP services running on a Tomcat
Apache Web server. Their general method of operation has already been shown in ﬁg-
ure 1 above: whenever the user wants to utilize a certain service that requires personal
information to be submitted in order to function (e.g., a tracking services that allows
telephone calls to be routed to the telephone at my current location), it contacts the ser-
vice proxy at a URI published either as part of a service discovery mechanisms such
as the one in Jini or a continuously running privacy beacon (currently simulated). The
service proxy replies with a list of available P3P policies (one such policy is shown in
ﬁgure 2), indicating various levels of service offered and the data needed in each case.
Depending on the user’s preferences, the user proxy then selects one such policy and
replies with the relevant data, using XML messages embedded in SOAP calls. Upon
successful completion of the interaction, the service proxy replies with an agreement id
that is kept by the user proxy for reference. Depending on each individual agreement,
clients can at any time after the data exchange use this agreement id to inspect the per-
sonal information stored with the service proxy, or request updates or deletion of their
personal data.In theexample givenin ﬁgure2(lines 5-8), theserviceonlyallows updat-
ing the user’s password (line 7). While provisions have been made to support digitally
signed SOAP messages [3], the current prototype only uses HTTP over SSL to prevent
eavesdropping. Authentication is simply done using the agreement id created from the
actual data exchange and returned to the client as part of the exchange protocol.
The privacy-aware database, pawDB, has been implemented as a Java-API on top
of an Oracle 8i database. In a ﬁrst step, P3P policies describing the reason for the
initial data collection (i.e., data collection policies) are imported into relational tables
using XML-DBMS [1] and are assigned a reference number. Data input through theAPI into pawDB then requires not only the actual data elements, but also a link (i.e.,
the reference number) to such a previously registered P3P policy (policies could also
be inserted on-the-ﬂy, this is simply a performance optimization). During insertion, the
system compares the submitted data to the privacy policy governing it and transpar-
ently stores all data elements together with a link to their privacy policy. In order to
query any of the stored data, data users will need to submit a corresponding data usage
policy themselves (in P3P format), describing in detail who they are, for what purpose
they are querying this information, and how long they in turn plan to keep this informa-
tion. Usage policies are thus not much different from the data collection policies used
during the initial data collection. The pawDB system then compares each query and its
usage policy to the data collection policy of each individual element and transparently
withholds a particular piece of information in case of a mismatch between the two. For
example, imagine the service provider of a follow-me telephone service offering an im-
proved service and wanting to inform its current users of this. The service provider’s
marketing division would then draw up a usage policydescribingthe purpose (“market-
ing”) of the query, as well as its own identity, together with the data elements it needs
(e.g., the user’s email address). Entering this policy into pawDB and running a corre-
sponding query (through the API) referencing this policy, will then return only those
email addresses where data owners have consented to marketing purposes. Each such
query is recorded in a data usage log linked to the agreement id of each recorded data
element. This allows data subjects to inspect all usages of their data through the list of
recorded usage policies. Furthermore, a daemon process (currently implemented as a
simple crontab script) takes care of the guaranteed storage periods set out in the orig-
inal data collection policies: periodically (e.g., every night), it compares the collection
timestamp of a data element to its guaranteed lifetime given in its policy and deletes
elements that have been kept longer than the allowed time.
4 Summary and future work
The idea of combining data with metadata governing its use is already popular for
enforcing digital copyright [4]. Successful implementation of this concept, however,
requires use of so-called “trusted systems” [9] along the whole distribution chain, oth-
erwise it would be fairly easy to separate data and metadata again. In contrast to digital
media systems, we are not aiming for hacker-proof data protection but instead assume
that the added-value of our trusted system pawDB (i.e., having the system make sure
that data collector honors privacy policy without costly manual veriﬁcation) will make
its usage popular among data collectors. Of course, it will still be important to add le-
gal requirements to that effect that provide a reasonable recourse mechanism for the
few abusers present. pawS can also be combined with popular privacy solutions cur-
rently developed for the Internet, such as anonymizing tools and identity management
systems. Our current privacy proxies can easily be hidden behind anonymizing proxy,
such as anonymizer.com, thus masking the proxy’s identity on the network level
and decoupling it from the user’s identity. Other popular tools such as Mix-based net-
works [10] could easily be employed for all wired network communications. If avail-
able, pawS components could also use anonymizing techniques on the physical layeras well (e.g., transient MAC-addresses, etc.). Similarly, it should also be possible to
incorporate identity management techniques [7] into this framework: every time a data
exchange is requested, the user’s system can respond with different data set. However,
one needs to remember that anonymity and pseudonymity in general might be less use-
ful in a ubicomp environment than on the Internet, simply because real-world data is
much more difﬁcult to anonymize completely.
With privacy proxies and pawDB, two important components of our pawS architec-
ture have been implemented. Our next step is to fully integrate the two components,
as well as implementing privacy announcement mechanisms such as privacy beacons
or Jini-integrated policy links. Using the P3P extension framework, a mechanism for
describing dissemination practices based on the location of the data collection (i.e., the
locality and proximity principle from section 2) needs to be incorporated into privacy
proxies and pawDB.Once a corresponding user interfacehas beendevised,a user-study
will ﬁnally need to show how useful a tool such as pawS will be.
In any case, the scope of pawS will remain deliberately limited at providing users
of ubicomp environments with a privacy-enabler, not with a tamper-proof privacy-
protector.As we movearoundin a ubicomp environment, ourpersonal privacy assistant
will keep track of all data collections happening with and without our help. Whenever
possible,ourassistant will enableordisableoptional services,basedonourpreferences.
Instead of alerting us to unwanted data collections, however, it might be more useful
as a silent but watchful transparency tool keeping track of whom we leave our personal
data with. While the actual inspection of its large logs, as well requests for data deletion
or updates might be less frequent for the individual user, it is the few cases when we
need to know what is going on where it will prove invaluable to us or any consumer
interest group, trying to hold data collectors accountable to their privacy statements.
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